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Abstract 
This paper uses the micro-data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS) to identify factors that explain fertility between 1995 and 2004. 
An overview of nationwide birth dynamics in post-Soviet Russia shows that not 
only do changes in economic conditions move in lockstep with the overall birth rate 
trend, as has been pointed out by numerous researchers, but so too do proximate 
determinants of fertility, and suggests that rises and falls in the total fertility rate in 
Russia are also affected by factors such as demographic timing effects. Although few 
studies employing micro data have been conducted, it is frequently argued that the 
shrinking of the economy during the transition to the market economy was the reason 
for the decline in the birth rate. However, many demographic researchers and 
sociologists, particularly in Russia itself, attribute the drop in the country’s birth rate 
from the 1990s to the long-term population trend, a view that also has widespread 
acceptance. 
While the previous studies all used fertility data up to 2001, this paper 
analyses data up to 2004, which is significant as the birth rate has shown a sustained 
rise since 2001. It was shown that household income levels do not have a significant 
impact on birth probability, and this may indicate the possibility that economic growth 
did not lead directly to the recovery in the birth rate. This suggests that social 
conditions in the broad sense may have caused the birth rate to rise. Finally, the paper 
examines, from a demographic perspective, the measures to encourage couples to have 
children that were introduced in the last days of the Putin Administration, which ended 
in May 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is common knowledge that declining birth rates have long been a subject of 
debate in many countries (Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2006; Ohbuchi, 1988), and falling 
birth rates have also been viewed as a serious issue in the former communist countries 
since the early 1990s, when they began their transition to capitalism, to the 21st century 
(Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). In the 1990 the total fertility rates (TFR) in these 
countries were generally higher than those in Western European countries. From then on, 
however, they declined rapidly, such that by 2000 the TFR was less than 1.7 in every 
region except central Asia, the Caucasus countries, Moldova (backward regions that 
used to be part of the Soviet Union), Albania, and Montenegro. Moreover, most of these 
countries actually had birth rates of less than 1.5 (Eurostat, 2002; Council of Europe, 
2001; Council of Europe, 2005. See Table 1.) 
  Needless to say, the Russian Federation is one of these countries. In 1989 
Russia’s TFR was 2.01, but it plummeted following the beginning of the transition to 
capitalism such that in 1999 and 2000 it had fallen below 1.20. A number of potential 
reasons for this drop spring to mind. The decline in incomes that accompanied the sharp 
fall in GDP obviously made it more difficult for families to cover the cost of 
childrearing. In addition, the former Soviet Union was known for having a high 
proportion of women in work, and with the employment rate for women remaining high, 
public facilities for assisting with childrearing such as nurseries and kindergartens, 
which in the past had been free, started charging for their services. At the same time, 
company-run kindergartens and other facilities began closing one after another
1. 
  Russia’s total population began falling in 1992, and the Russian government 
has implemented various measures to stem this decline. With the TFR dropping below 
1.2 in 1999 and 2000, in 2001 the Russian federal government produced a plan for 
halting the population decline by 2015
2. This plan offered guidelines for improving the 
health of citizens and implementing measures to raise the birth rate. However, like so 
many other “plans” produced by the Russian government
3, it would be difficult to argue 
that it had any realistic significance, as no new measures against the declining birth rate 
and rising death rate were introduced at the time. 
                                                  
1  Vechernaya Moskva, No. 37, Feb. 3, 2007; Vechernii Peterburg, Aug. 25, 2009.     
2  Rasporyazhenie pravitel’stva RF ot 24. 09. 2001 No. 1270-r.   
3 An example of such plans is the long-term development program for the Far East and Transbaikal 
(Postanovlenie pravitel’stva RF ot 15.04. 1996 No. 480). As for the evaluations on the plan for halting the 
population decline by 2015, see Mironov (2006), Chairman of the Federation Council of Russia.  3  
  The author will not rehash here the overall long-term impact of a declining 
birth rate, i.e. difficulty in sustaining the pension system, changes in the supply of 
labour, shrinking markets, and so on (Shirahase, 2006; Takayama and Saito, 2006). With 
issues such as problems securing labour being frequently taken up in the media
4, Russia 
faces the same problems as other countries with low birth rates. Japan and the West are 
in similar situations, yet when compared with the amount of birth-rate-related research 
that has been conducted in these countries in recent years, research on the birth rate in 
Russia remains inadequate. The analysis conducted in Russia and the West has been 
limited quantitatively. 
  In Russia there is no equivalent to Japan’s National Fertility Survey, which is 
conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and one reason for the 
paucity of previous research is that the available data is difficult to use. Having said that, 
micro-level quantitative analysis using the data from the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS), which will be discussed later, has already begun, so 
studying fertility determinants by looking at the characteristics of individuals is by no 
means impossible. 
  Russia’s TFR actually bottomed out in 1999 and climbed continuously until 
2004. It has also risen continually since, save for a temporary dip in 2005 (Rosstat, 
2008). Many commentators have pointed to the sustained rise in economic growth since 
1999 as a contributory factor (Antonov, 2008; Rosstat, 2009). However, in-depth 
analysis contending that economic growth did not lead directly to the recovery in the 
birth rate has also been conducted (Roshina and Boikov, 2005). Finding out whether 
fertility is determined by economic factors is essential for forecasting the future fertility 
trend in Russia, which has achieved sustained economic growth by producing ever 
increasing amounts of raw materials. However, the most recent fertility data employed 
in previous research involving quantitative analysis was for 2001, making it impossible 
to grasp the trend for the years that followed. In light of this situation, this paper relies 
on micro-data from the RLMS, and identifies factors that can explain the fertility trend 
between 1995 and 2004. 
  This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
fertility dynamics in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is shown that 
not only do changes in economic conditions move in lockstep with the overall birth rate 
                                                  
4  Rossiiskaya gazeta-Privolzhe, Mar. 31, 2007; Agrmenty i fakty, Oct. 15, 2008. The decline in Russia’s 
birth rate began at the end of the 1980s (its TFR has been well below 2.0 since 1990), and labour 
shortages have already emerged as a serious issue. See Figure 2.  4  
trend, as has been pointed out by numerous researchers, but so too do proximate 
determinants of fertility, and suggests that rises and falls in Russia’s TFR are also 
affected by factors such as demographic timing effects. Section 3 looks at previous 
research. Although few birth-rate studies employing micro-data have been conducted, it 
is frequently argued that the shrinking of the economy during the economic transition 
was the reason for the decline in the birth rate. However, many demographic 
researchers and sociologists, particularly in Russia itself, hold that the drop in the 
country’s TFR from the 1990s should be attributed to the long-term population trend, a 
view that has also existed for a long time. Section 4 contains the analysis. While the 
previous studies all used birth data up to 2001, this paper employs data up to 2004, 
which is significant as the birth rate showed a sustained rise from 2001 onwards. It was 
shown that personal incomes did not have a significant impact on fertility-related 
behaviour at any time during the period subject to the analysis, and this may indicate 
the possibility that economic growth did not lead directly to the recovery in the birth 
rate. Finally, the paper examines, from a demographic perspective and taking into 
account the results of the research in this paper and findings from previous research, the 
measures to encourage couples to have children that were introduced in the last days of 
the Putin Administration, which ended in May 2008. 
 
2. Fertility Dynamics as Viewed Through Macro Indicators 
 
Russia’s population crisis is well known. In 1998, the journal World 
Development carried a feature article on population dynamics in Russia. The article 
discussed such phenomena as the increase in the death rate among men of working age, 
the high level of accidents as a cause of death among such men, and the sharp decline in 
the birth rate. 
  The falling birth rate and rising death rate saw Russia’s population slip into 
natural decline (see Figure 1) from 1992. Obviously, a low birth rate is a phenomenon 
seen in many advanced countries, but what has put Russia and other former communist 
countries in the spotlight is the sheer speed with which the birth rate has dropped, 
something that was mentioned at the very beginning of this paper. 
  1989 was the last year in which Russia’s TFR exceeded 2.0, yet only four years 
later (in 1993) it slipped below 1.50 (Rosstat, 2008). The pace of decline in the birth  5  
rate was higher than in any of the European countries in the OECD
5, and the fact that 
the birth rate has remained low for over 15 years is a characteristic feature of population 
dynamics in Russia (see Figure 2). 
  As Figure 2 shows, however, the TFR bottomed out at 1.16 in 1999, since 
which it has staged a gradual recovery. So how can the sharp drop in the birth rate at the 
beginning of the transition to the market economy and the recovery, albeit gentle, from 
1999 onwards be explained? Intuitively, one would expect the massive changes in the 
social system that immediately followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, i.e. the 
economic crisis and the economic transition, to have had a negative impact on fertility. 
It is also easy to imagine that the rise in the TFP from 1999 was closely related to the 
economic recovery. Looking at Figure 3, which illustrates the trends in GDP and the 
TFP from 1991, one can see that they both followed a similar path
6. However, it is also 
worth investigating trends in proximate determinants of fertility, to see whether any 
complementary factors can be identified. 
  With regard to marriage dynamics, the marriage rate declined sharply from the 
early 1990s and remained low until around 2000 (see Figure 4). Even leaving criticism 
of the correlation with the economic transition aside, it can be seen that the age at which 
people marry has risen gradually and that the age of women when they have children 
has also increased (see Figures 5 and 6). This suggests that, as in other countries, the 
effect of the timing of childbirth may have exacerbated the decline in the TFR during 
this period. 
  From 2000, however, the marriage rate exhibited a marked increase. Not only 
did the marriage rate rise, but as with the period prior to 2000, the mean age at which 
women married also increased. This suggests that the rise in the TFR since 2000 may 
have been related to a gradual increase in the age at which women marry and have 
children, i.e. the timing effects. 
  Trends in the birth rate for women in different age groups illustrate this even 
more clearly (see Table 7). Throughout the 1990s the birth rate for women aged 20–24 
years, who have the highest birth rate in Russia, exhibited a sharp and fairly sustained 
decline. This occurred amid a gradual decline in the birth rate among other age groups, 
which is obviously in accord with the drop in the overall birth rate observed through 
                                                  
5 World Bank website, “Key Development Data & Statistics”, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piP
K:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html, accessed on September 20, 2009. 
6  However, given that R = 0.56, it is questionable whether there can be said to be strong correlation.  6  
other data. Although the birth rate for the 20–24 age group showed some fluctuation 
after the 1990s, it did not register any marked increase. What is worthy of attention, 
however, is that the birth rate for women in the three five-year age groups from 25–29 
to 35–39 years bottomed out in 1999 and began to climb. And indeed, the TFR as seen 
through macro data has exhibited a steady rise since the major bottom of 1999, with a 
temporary drop in 2005 as the only blip (see Figure 2). In demographic terms, this can 
be seen as a result of people temporarily delaying having children during the economic 
contraction that stemmed from the transition to the market economy. Another possible 
interpretation is that the general trend in Russia seems to be to have children at older 
ages. 
  When examining demographic factors, it goes without saying that attention 
also needs to be given to parity or birth order (Kaneko, 2004). In 1998, however, 
ZAGS
7, an organisation that registers births, deaths, marriages, etc. in Russia, changed 
the way it registered births. Until then birth records included birth order, but in 1999 the 
boxes for recording birth order were removed from birth registration forms
8, making it 
impossible to gather data on birth order for children born in or after that year
9 (Antonov, 
2008, p.59). As a result, Rosstat stopped publishing data on things like the age of 
women when they had their first child, making it impossible to study this sphere
10. 
 
3. Previous Research 
 
From 1992, Russia’s total population began to decline and the death rate rose 
sharply. The birth rate dropped precipitously following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and this situation soon became an object of inquiry in Russia (Vishnevskii, 1994). 
                                                  
7 ZAGS is an organisation that registers births, deaths, marriages, divorces, etc. For more details, see 
Appendix I of Kumo, Morinaga, and Shida (2007). 
8  Boxes for recording birth order were removed from all birth registration forms (Zapis’ akta o rozhdenii, 
forma No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, No. 5). 
9 Obzor Federalnogo zakona No, 143-FZ ot 15. 11. 1997 <Ob aktakh grazhdanskogo sostoyaniya> (v 
redaktsii Federalnikh zakonov ot 25.10.2001; N138-F3 ot 29.04. 2002 N44-F3 ot 22.04.2003; N46-F3 ot 
07.07.2003 N120-F3). Although parity statistics could be obtained using data from the Social Insurance 
Fund of the Russian Federation, this data probably relates to things like the payment of childrearing 
allowances, and does not therefore constitute a record of births themselves. In fact, in 2007 there was a 
discrepancy of almost 150,000 babies between the number of births recorded in the Social Insurance Fund 
data and the number of births announced by Rosstat based on ZAGS data. See Rosstat, Sem’ya v Rossii, 
2008, Moskva, p. 77.   
10 In addition, even the survey providing usable micro-data (to be discussed later) only included the 
question of how many children the woman had had at the time of the survey for a few years after the 
survey first started to be carried out, making it impossible to perform a comprehensive analysis of parity.  7  
  However, it took a fairly long time for work to begin on analyzing the factors 
behind it, as data obviously needed to be accumulated for a long enough period. 
Although Vishnevskii (1996) highlighted the coexistence of a decline in the mean age at 
which women had children and a decline in the birth rate during the early 1990s, a 
phenomenon that would normally be expected to be self-contradictory, and produced 
findings emphasising the distinctiveness of Russia in this respect, it should be pointed 
out that the trend seen since the late 1990s shows that this was ultimately just a 
short-term phenomenon
11. In addition, at the beginning of the transition to the market 
economy, analysis was limited by the fact that it had to rely on macro data. Obviously, 
though, descriptive research has been conducted continuously not only in Russia itself 
but also in the West. While many studies have focused on the economic contraction that 
accompanied the economic transition as a cause (DaVanzo and Grammich, 2001), others 
have pointed to the timing effect resulting from the fact that policies aimed at 
encouraging couples to have children, such as increased childrearing allowances, that 
were introduced at the end of the Soviet era caused the birth rate to rise at the end of the 
1980s, which then resulted in it falling back during the early 1990s (Zakharov and 
Ivanova, 1996). Others, meanwhile, have positioned the decline in the birth rate as 
being consistent with Russian population dynamics undergoing a long process of 
modernisation (Vishnevskii, 2006). 
Avdeev and Monnier (1995) studied the sharp fall in the birth rate in Russia 
between the end of the Soviet era and the beginning of the economic transition in the 
early 1990s by comparing cohort fertility rates over time and among countries. 
Although their study did not analyze the determinants of birth rates, it provided a fairly 
straightforward summary of population dynamics in Russia in the second half of the 
20th century, a comparatively long period of time. Meanwhile, Kharikova and Andreev 
(2000), using results from a micro census carried out in Russia in 1994
12, not only 
pointed to the economic contraction during the transition to capitalism as a cause of the 
decline in the birth rate, but also offered an interpretation of it as the continuation of a 
long-term trend. This interpretation was based on patterns beginning in the Soviet era, 
trends in the number of births for each cohort, and so on. 
                                                  
11  Though why this phenomenon occurred at the beginning of the transition to capitalism may be worthy 
of further investigation.   
12  This micro census was carried out between February 14 and 23, 1994. Covering 7.3 million people, or 
5% of the total population, it gathered data on dwellings, household income and expenditure, birthplace, 
domicile, educational attainment, marriage, livelihood, occupation, and fertility. See Goskomstat Rossii 
(1995).  8  
Not many studies have analyzed birth rates using the micro-data from the 
Russia Longitudinal Survey (RLMS), a survey of Russian households. Kohler and 
Kohler (2002) studied the effect on birth rates later of job market conditions, an initial 
desire on the part of the woman to have children, and subjective judgements such as 
perceptions concerning the economic climate and expectations for the future. However, 
the scope of the control variables used was limited, while the fact that it covered only a 
short-period (1995–1997) of the economic contraction makes it difficult to draw clear 
conclusions from the results. 
Grogan (2006), using data from the RLMS between 1994 and 2001, found that 
high levels of income and education among women boosted the birth rate, while 
advanced age and a high number of existing children reduced it. She also pointed out 
that because income has a positive, significant effect on the birth rate, the level of 
economic growth determines a direction for fertility dynamics. The analysis by Grogan 
(2006) only covered women who had spouses throughout the entire period studied, and 
the sample contained only 288 individuals. It must also be pointed out that limiting the 
sample to women with spouses must have had a big impact on the determinants of 
fertility identified. It also needs to be borne in mind that, as was the case with the study 
by Kohler and Kohler (2002), the variables used in the analysis were limited. 
Roshina and Boikov (2005) can be said to have conducted the most 
comprehensive fertility study using RLMS data to date, having employed a broad range 
of variables and subjected their sample to a wide variety of investigations and analyses. 
They took into account demographic factors such as age and the number of existing 
children, economic factors such as income and employment, and various other factors 
such as health, educational attainment, and ethnicity. The significance of the economic 
factors was unstable, depending on the model defined. They found that demographic 
factors, on the other hand, were almost always significant, so argued that explanations 
should focus on these. In other words, they pointed out that economic conditions and 
birth rates are not directly connected, which is in line with the view presented in this 
paper. 
  Like that used by Grogan (2006), however, the data employed by Roshina and 
Boikov (2005) stops at 2001, and thus covers only a period of decline in terms of 
fertility and economic activity. Their study therefore does not capture the period, after 
2001, when the birth rate climbed. And given the fact that almost all the former 
communist countries experienced a decline in the birth rate simultaneously during the 
early transition period, their conclusion that the birth rate is not influenced by economic  9  
factors is questionable. In light of these weaknesses, this paper will attempt to analyse 
factors that explain childbirth using data obtained from the RLMS carried out between 
1994 and 2004. 
   
4. Analysis 
 
4.1 Data and Methods 
 
4.1.1 Data 
The data employed in this paper comes from forms returned from the RLMS. 
Although detailed information about the RLMS is available on the survey’s website, 
here is a brief overview
13. 
  The RLMS is a micro survey of households and individuals in Russia that has 
been conducted continuously since 1992. It is organised and coordinated by the 
Carolina Population Institute of the University of North Carolina in the United States. 
The survey possesses representativeness of the nation as a whole, and the sample covers 
at least 3,700 households and 10,000 individuals
14. Although the aim of the survey is to 
monitor changes in levels of consumption and health during the economic transition, it 
also gathers detailed information on the employment situation, incomes, etc. of 
individuals. 
  The questions are revised to some degree with each round, and on occasion the 
questionnaires are altered radically. Basically, however, information on fertility can be 
obtained at every round from responses to questions concerning women. These include 
the question, “Have you given birth to a child during the past 12 months?” Responses to 
this question were used to compile fertility data
15. However, there were big differences 
                                                  
13  The website URL is http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms/.     
14 Although the sample size changes with each round, Phase I, which was conducted in 1992-1993, 
targeted approximately 6,000 households, while Phase II, which was conducted from 1994, targeted 
around 4,000. Because of reasons such as the fact that the sample differed in nature, data from Phase I is 
not normally used, so only Phase II is referred to here. 
15 For Round IX (2000), however, the question was changed to, “Have you given birth to a child during 
the past 24 months?” Individuals who answered yes to this question and could be determined as being 
mothers of a child younger than 12 months using household roster variables were deemed to have given 
birth to a child during the past year. Round XIII (2004), meanwhile, did not even include a question on 
whether the subject had given birth, so mothers were identified using roster variables for households with 
a child under the age of 12 months and deemed to have given birth during the past year. Unfortunately, in 
both these cases the births of children who had died or been fostered out within 12 months of birth were 
not included. However, this can be tolerated as a secondary proximity because, for other rounds, even  10 
between rounds in the number and quality of questions concerning women that were 
asked. For example, questions yielding variables that can be expected to relate closely 
to the birth rate, such as the number of children the woman has given birth to and 
whether she has ever had an abortion, were only asked during the first four rounds of 
Phase II, i.e. Round V to Round VIII. There are therefore limitations in applying to 
other purposes the results of a survey that was originally intended to yield data on levels 
of consumption and health situations. 
  The basic intention was to repeatedly gather cross-sectional data, so the 
potential for using samples as panel data is limited (Heeringa, S.G., 1997). Grogan 
(2006), who investigated the attrition of RLMS samples, compared the samples from 
1994 and 2001 and showed that the frequency of attrition for individuals with a spouse 
and households with small children was significantly low. It therefore needs to be borne 
in mind that these are factors that exert an extremely strong influence on the birth rate. 
 
4.1.2 Methods 
Here the author will investigate whether economic conditions, and in particular 
personal incomes, affect the fertility behaviour of women, or whether other factors have 
a greater impact. As was seen in section 2, a correlation exists between GDP and the 
TFR. If this is the result of a direct causal relationship, economic growth in Russia 
should have contributed to the recovery in the birth rate there. If, on the other hand, 
researchers like Vishnevskii (2006) and Roshina and Boikov (2005) are right, and 
Russia’s fertility dynamics should be seen as part of a long-term shift in demographic 
factors, i.e. the modernisation of population dynamics or a second demographic 
transition, the correlation between GDP and the TFR (see Figure 3) as seen through 
macro data is coincidental, and it should be assumed that more complex causal 
relationships exist. 
  This paper employs micro-data from Round V (1994), the first round of Phase 
II, to Round XIII (2004), the most recent round for which data was available. It 
investigates the relationship between individual characteristics of women in Round t 
and whether women with these characteristics gave birth to a child in Round t+1. 
                                                                                                                                                  
when an analysis was performed with (a) responses by mothers to the question of whether they had given 
birth and (b) the existence of a child younger than 12 months determined by roster variables both deemed 
to be explained variables, no marked differences were seen between the results. (Within RLMS samples, 
there was a 20 per mill difference between the two variables (i.e. whether they answered that they had 
given birth and whether they had a child younger than 12 months). Incidentally, the infant mortality rate 
in the whole of Russia between 1994 and 2004 was between 11.6 and 18.6 per mill. See Rosstat, 2008).  11 
  The samples of analysis were women between the ages of 15 and 49 years. 
Whether a woman gave birth to a child in a certain round was the explained variable, 
while the individual characteristics in the previous round were the explanatory 
variables
16. When Roshina and Boikov (2005) performed their analysis and determined 
their estimation models, there is a possibility that various external shocks and changes 
in the significance of various different variables were absorbed by the year dummy 
variables. Attention also needs to be paid to the fact that Russia’s birth rate changed 
course in 1999–2000, so it is necessary to look at whether any changes occurred in the 
determinants of fertility during the period under analysis. This study therefore begins 
with a cross-sectional analysis
17. For this cross-sectional analysis, the problem of a 
sharp reduction in the size of the sample due to an increase in the number of 
uncompleted forms, and the resultant failure to obtain significant coefficients, was 
avoided by limiting the number of variables employed. The following variables are 
demographic factors: (1) age, (2) whether the woman wants children, (3) the number of 
children already in the household and its square, and (4) whether the woman has a 
spouse. (3) is used as a substitute for data on parity, which was not gathered. The 
following variables are other economic factors: (5) the woman’s income, (6) the 
household’s income (real income adjusted using an equivalence scale
18) and its square, 
(7) whether the family are owner-occupiers, (8) the woman’s subjective judgement on 
whether she are satisfied with her current life, (9) and whether the woman is in work. 
The following variables are other explanatory variables: (10) educational attainment 
(secondary or vocational education, higher education) and (11) whether the woman lives 
in a rural area. Descriptive statistics for several years are presented in Table 2a. If it can 
be inferred from this data that women are having children later in life, (1) would be 
expected to exhibit changes. As is the case when they are used in analyses of the general 
                                                  
16 There were two-year gaps between Round VII (survey performed between October and December 
1996) and Round VIII (survey performed between October 1998 and January 1999), and between Round 
VIII and Round IX (survey performed in 2000), whereas the other surveys were conducted at one-year 
intervals. From Round IX onwards, the surveys were performed between September and December every 
year. So although the lag was generally one year, for Round VIII and Round IX it was two years (see the 
variables in the RLMS form data). 
17 However, only panel data is used for the interval between two rounds. This makes it possible to 
investigate whether individual characteristics at Round t are determinants of childbirth in Round t+1. 
18 This equivalence scale is based on OECD standards. Although an attempt was made to use real 
household incomes, real household expenditures, nominal incomes, etc. that had not been adjusted using 
an equivalence scale, the cross-sectional analysis produced the same results as those presented in this 
paper for real household incomes and expenditures. Note that because nominal incomes cannot be 
normalised, a pooled logit analysis cannot be performed.  12 
level of fertility, a higher value for (3) would be expected to reduce birth probability 
while an affirmative value for (4) would be expected to increase it. Higher or 
affirmative values for (5)–(9), on the other hand, which are all economic factors, can, if 
one adheres to the view that the economic growth from 1999 boosted Russia’s birth rate, 
be assumed to increase birth probability. If an interpretation in the style of Becker 
(1960) is adopted, it goes without saying that higher values for (5) raise the opportunity 
cost of childrearing and can be seen as reducing the likelihood of the woman having 
children. An affirmative value for (10) will often reduce birth probability, while women 
answering yes to (11) can be assumed to give birth more frequently than those living in 
cities. 
  In addition, to significantly increase the number of explanatory variables that 
can be compared throughout the entire period and to ensure an adequate sample size, a 
pooled logit analysis was performed using pooled data for all the rounds. This involved 
the introduction of some new variables: (A) living with a man of an age eligible to 
receive pension benefits, (B) living with a woman of an age eligible to receive pension 
benefits, (C) living area of the dwelling (not including bathrooms etc.), (D) the total 
floor area of the dwelling (including bathrooms etc.), (E) expectations concerning future 
standard of living, (F) regional dummies, (G) various indicators of household income, 
and (H) year dummies. Previous research indicates that higher or affirmative values for 
(A)–(E) will increase birth probability
19 . (F) enables information on regional 
characteristics to be gleaned, but the key variables here are (G). To find out whether or 
not income levels really do affect the birth rate in Russia, the analysis involved the 
investigation of one income variable after another. The descriptive statistics used in the 




The results of the cross-sectional analysis are presented in Table 3, while those 
of the pooled logit analysis are shown in Table 4. 
  It is obvious in Table 3 that age, number of existing children, and 
presence/absence of a spouse, which are pure demographic variables, had a significant 
impact on the birth rate in almost every year, and between 1990 and 1999 no other 
                                                  
19  None of the variables yielded significant results in the cross-sectional analysis. Given the small sample 
size for each individual year, they were only used for the pooled logit analysis.  13 
variables exerted any significant influence
20. 
  No tendency for birth probability to increase with the age of the mother could 
be observed
21. As was predicted, however, the likelihood of a child being born declined 
as the number of existing children increased, while the presence of a spouse raised birth 
probability. 
  On the other hand, it can be said that household income itself did not have any 
significant effect on the results of the analysis, at least during the 1990s. After 2000, 
however, higher levels of education and overall satisfaction with life (the latter of which 
was assessed by the women subjectively) yielded significant results. In addition, being 
in work sometimes raised birth probability. None of the other variables showed 
significant results. The wages earned by the woman herself had no impact. The results 
for educational attainment, meanwhile, revealed that women with relatively high levels 
of education were more likely to have children than women with very low levels of 
education, i.e. women who had completed secondary school or had an even lower level 
of education than that. 
  So how should these results be interpreted? It would be unnatural to attempt to 
explain, as Roshina and Boikov (2005) did, the decline in the birth rate that occurred 
simultaneously in the former communist countries in the early 1990s without any 
reference to socioeconomic factors. 
  One possible interpretation is that the economic contraction of the 1990s was 
so severe, pushing incomes down to a level at which people struggled to survive, that it 
did not have any significant impact. In other words, the findings may need to be viewed 
from the perspective that unless incomes are to some degree higher than the above level, 
any increase in them will not affect people’s decisions on whether to have children. 
After 2000 the economy began to recover, and the results for several years indicate that 
positive views among individuals about the economic climate raised birth probability. 
Although it was difficult to see any direct impact from income, there is nothing odd in 
the notion that a shift in subjective attitudes concerning things like economic growth 
                                                  
20 The results for 1995 and 2000 differ in nature from those of the other years. In these years, and these 
years only, the variables for the number of children in the household and the presence/absence of a spouse 
were insignificant. This is very different from the findings of previous research. Births in 2000 are 
assigned a two-year lag stretching back to the Russian financial crisis of 1998. Moreover, 1994–1995 was 
a period of turmoil in which inflation reached 300% in 1994 and 200% in 1995 (inflation finally fell 
below 50% in 1996), so perhaps should not treated in the same way as the other periods. 
21  Even when five-year age groups (15–19 years, 20–24 years, 25–29 years, 30–34 years, etc.) were used, 
there was no major change in the results.  14 
and adapting to the market economy could have raised the likelihood of women having 
children. 
  Now let the author turn his attention to the results of the pooled logit analysis. 
As expected, factors such as the number of existing children and the age of the woman 
were significant. In addition, living with people old enough to receive pension benefits, 
a variable that was not employed in the cross-sectional analysis, raised the likelihood of 
a woman having children, which is also in line with inferences drawn from previous 
research. The regional dummies clearly showed that the likelihood of having children 
was significantly lower in big cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg than in other 
regions
22. Living environments did not have a significant impact. The fact that being an 
owner-occupier reduces the likelihood of a woman having children may just indicate 
that a higher percentage of women whose childbearing days are over own their own 
homes. In addition, 89% of the entire sample, which is a very high figure, were 
owner-occupiers, and this probably also had an impact (see Table 2b). The reason year 
dummies did not yield any significant results was probably that the birth rate remained 
low throughout the period covered
23.   
  However, attention should be focused on the following findings from this 
analysis. The degree of life satisfaction, being in work, and educational attainment 
consistently showed significant results. Income variables, on the other hand, despite 
being repeatedly redefined and reemployed, did not yield significant results when using 
formulas (1) to (4) in Table 2b. These results can be said to more sharply reinforce the 
findings from the cross-sectional analysis. The focus of this paper has been on whether 
childbirth can be determined by economic factors, and income levels in particular. As 
one can see, however, the conclusions that can be drawn are that if the results of the 
analysis of the impact of household incomes are interpreted literally, they do not have 
any overall impact, and that childbirth in Russia is determined to a great extent by 
demographic factors and factors relating to things like social conditions, such as the 
presence of a stable living environment. 
  Further conclusions can be drawn from the fact that after 2001 high levels of 
educational attainment significantly increased childbirth probability and the fact that the 
results of the pooled logit analysis indicated that high levels of educational attainment 
                                                  
22 Although the results are not shown here, it was confirmed that if none of the regional dummies are 
employed, “living in a rural area” significantly raised birth probability for all specifications. 
23 Unfortunately, the period 1992–1994, when external shocks were probably at their peak, could not be 
analysed because there was no comparable data.  15 
significantly raised the likelihood of women having children. The phenomenon of 
education boosting the birth rate is unusual given the experiences of other countries, 
where the completion of higher education has typically reduced the birth rate by 
delaying marriage and childbirth, increasing levels of knowledge about health and 
contraception, and so on (Moriizumi, 2005; Wada, 2004; Eloundous-Enyegue, 1999; 
Axinn and Barber, 2001). So how can this phenomenon be explained? 
  One possible explanation is that it may indicate that in Russia, which 
experienced social turmoil and plunging incomes during the 1990s, educational 
attainment has become a proxy variable for permanent income. The fact that permanent 
income cannot be claimed to have been a key determinant of childbirth in the 1990s 
should be explained in terms of external shocks that occurred at that time, while it may 
be possible to conclude that from 2000, when the economy began to grow and incomes 
started to rise, permanent income had a positive effect on fertility. The finding that 
having a job and being on the whole satisfied with life yielded significant results can 
probably also be interpreted in the same way. 
  Changing our perspective once again, while birth rates in the transitional, 
former communist countries were higher than in some low-birth-rate European 
countries, they were not at the extremely high levels seen in developing countries. 
Figure 8 compares the simple means of the TFRs of the former communist countries 
excluding Central Asia and the Caucasus (both in the former Soviet Union) and Albania, 
which are shown in Table 1, with those of the European OECD countries
24. In the 1960s 
there was hardly any difference between them. From the 1970s, however, the TFRs of 
the OECD countries gradually declined, and by the early 1980s a gap had opened up. 
However, it can be seen that from the end of the 1980s the TFRs of the former 
communist countries plummeted to the levels seen in the OECD countries, and then 
continued to fall further. If the former communist countries were doing no more than 
“catching up” in the process of demographic transition, this decline in the birth rate can 
be seen, as it is by Vishnevskii (2006), as being part of a long-term shift in population 
dynamics
25.  
  Whatever the reason for the plunge, it can be said to be inappropriate to view 
economic growth and the accompanying rise in incomes as a direct cause of the 
                                                  
24 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Britain. 
25 However, even if it is seen in this way, an explanation is still needed for why the TFRs of the former 
communist countries dropped so much faster than those of the OECD countries.  16 
recovery in childbirth in Russia. In this respect, the results of the analysis conducted in 
this paper yield the same conclusions as those of Roshina and Boikov (2005). Even so, 
it needs to be borne in mind that the marriage rate and age at marriage, which are 
proximate determinants of fertility, as well as age at childbirth may also be influenced 
by income levels and economic conditions. In this sense, the possibility that economic 
growth may contribute indirectly to boosting the birth rate should not be ignored. This 
can also be gleaned from the fact that the results of the cross-sectional analysis of the 
period after 2000 showed that in some years high levels of educational attainment, 
overall satisfaction with life, and being in work significantly raised birth probability, 
and from the fact that the pooled logit analysis showed that all these factors 




Previous research on fertility has made it clear, even obvious, that the 
relationship between women’s personal incomes and the likelihood of them having 
children is not linear. In the case of post-Soviet Russia, however, the macro-level 
economic recovery and growth and the stabilisation of society coincided with an 
increase in the birth rate, leading people to assume that there was a correlation between 
the rise in incomes and the recovery in the birth rate. 
  However, this paper has shown that high personal incomes do not significantly 
increase the likelihood of women having children. Having said that, it is certainly 
possible that the birth rate plunged at around the time the economic transition began 
because of the sharp drop in incomes and extremely unclear outlook for the future that 
occurred/existed during the transition. Economic growth or social stability therefore 
probably contributed, to some extent, to the recovery in the birth rate in Russia. 
However, the impact of these factors was not direct, making it difficult to judge whether 
they will continue to produce the same results in the future. 
  The annual state of the nation addresses given by (former) President Putin in 
2005 and 2006 also touched on the problem of the slump in the birth rate, and gave 
increasing it as a policy goal. This led to childrearing allowances and other benefits 
being raised in December 2006
26, and a childrearing support scheme
27 called the 
                                                  
26 Federal’nyi zakon ot 5 dekabrya 2006, No.207-FZ o bnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye akty Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v chasti gosudarstvennoi podderzhki grazhdan, imeyushchikh detei. Childrearing allowances 
and other benefits went from a flat 700 roubles per child to 1,500 roubles for the first child and 3,000  17 
“Mothers’ Fund” being established. 
  The Mothers’ Fund provides parents of two or more children with a total of 
250,000 roubles in subsidies for one of housing, education, or pension contributions, 
and applies to children born or adopted between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 
2016. Given that the mean monthly income in Russia in September 2007 was 12,000 
roubles, the value of these subsidies is huge
28. Under this backdrop, a presidential order 
to halt the population decline by 2025
29, which was dated October 9, 2007, was 
formulated. Unlike the various “plans” produced in the past, this presidential order was 
accompanied by actual policies. Of course, it is still too early to judge the extent of the 
impact these measures will have. As this paper has shown, in Russia the impact on 
fertility behaviour of direct cash payments to families is not easy to predict. 
  As one can see, the number of births has been rising almost continuously since 
1999 (see Figure 1). However, because the number of deaths has also generally 
remained high, it is difficult to argue that the overall natural decline as been halted. 
Nevertheless, vital statistics for 2007 and 2008 show that the crude birth rate was at its 
highest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union in both these years. Meanwhile, the 
crude death rate has also exhibited a sharp decline in recent years. 
  In light of these developments, since the second half of 2007, once the number 
of births had been seen to be in a steady upward trend, (former) President Putin and 
cabinet ministers have stated on several occasions that their population policies are 
already having an effect
30. Although the view that political measures introduced in 
January 2007 were already influencing fertility behaviour in June of the same year is no 
more than political spin, quite a few articles in the media have presented it as fact. 
However, even though they may simply have been overlooked, such arguments fail to 
take account of demographic factors, and it is therefore difficult to view them as 
appropriate. The significance of demographic factors can be clearly seen in Figure 9, 
which shows the population pyramid in 2004, before the series of measures to 
                                                                                                                                                  
roubles for the second, third, etc. “Federal’nyi zakon ot 1 marta 2008, No.18-FZ o vnesenii izmenenii v 
otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v tselyakh povysheniya razmerov otdel’nykh vidov 
sotsial’nykh vyplat i stoimosti nabora sotsial’nykh uslug” provides for these amounts to be revised in line 
with the rate of inflation. 
27 Federal’nyi zakon ot 29 dekabrya 2006, No.256-FZ o dopolnitel’nykh merakh gosudarstvennoi 
podderzhki semei, imeyushchikh detei.   
28 And like childrearing allowances, this amount is revised annually to take account of inflation. 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, Feb. 14, 2008.   
29  Kontseptsiya demograficheskoi politiki RF do 2025 g., 9 oktyabrya 2007 No.1351.   
30  Izvestiya, June 1, 2007.; Rossiiskaya gazeta, Dec. 25, 2007.      18 
encourage couples to have children had been introduced. 
  The increase in the number of births following the Second World War can be 
seen in the swelling in the number of people in their 40s, and the size of the population 
of their offspring can be seen in the swelling in the number of people in their 20s. 
Figure 9 is the population pyramid for 2004, and those in their 20s at the beginning of 
the 20th century have still to reach their peak age for fertility. In short, even in the 
absence of any measures to boost the birth rate, the first 10–20 years of the 21st century 
would be expected to see high crude birth rates. In fact, Rosstat, the Russian Federal 
State Statistics Service, had already predicted, in 2004, that the birth rate would climb 
continuously until 2016
31. It goes without saying that the number of births is strongly 
influenced by the number of people of reproductive age, and it is therefore clearly 
meaningless to criticise the effect of the measures to encourage couples to have children 
unless the impact of such factors is eliminated. Even if the policy impact of the 
aforementioned Mothers’ Fund did indeed cause the birth rate to rise since 2007, all it 
was actually doing was bringing forward the timing of births that could have happened 
in the future anyway, so there is also a possibility of the birth rate declining again later. 
In fact, in 2009 Rosstat revised the forecast it made in 2004, and is now predicting that 
the birth rate will stop rising in 2012 (as opposed to 2016)
32.  
  The TFR is also on an upward trend. However, the experiences of other 
countries make it clear that fertility is not solely determined by short-term factors such 
as rising incomes or by the economic climate, and the analysis using micro-data 
performed in this paper can be seen as further evidence for this. Experience also 
suggests that policy measures to encourage couples to have children may have only a 
short-term impact. However, the long-term trend will need to be observed to judge 
whether the fertility trend seen since 2006 will be sustained. 
                                                  
31  From internal documents supplied by Rosstat. 
32 Rosstat  website,  http://db2.gks.ru/visual2/. Accessed on September 30, 2009.    19 
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1995 2000 2005
Albania 5.4 4.8 4.4 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.8
Bulgaria 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3
Czech Republic 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.3
Slovakia 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.3
Hungary 1.8 2.0 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.3
Poland 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.2
Romania 1.9 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
Montenegro 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6
Croatia 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4
Serbia 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.4 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2
Macedonia 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
Slovenia 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Latvia 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.3
Lithuania 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3
Estonia 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.5
Russian Federation 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3
Belarus 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.2
Ukraine 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.2
Moldova 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.7
Armenia 3.8 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.7
Azerbaijan 5.2 4.7 3.9 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.0
Georgia 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.4
Tajikistan 6.6 6.8 6.3 5.7 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.5
Kazakhstan 3.5 3.4 3.3 2.9 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 1.8 2.2
Kyrgyz 4.6 4.9 4.9 4.1 4.2 3.7 3.6 3.3 2.4 2.5
Turkmenistan 6.5 6.2 5.7 5.0 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.4 2.9 2.6






























Source: World Bank (2009). 
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Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008). 
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  Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008). 
  25 






















Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008) and RSE, 2002, 2003, 2009. 
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Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008). 


































  Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008).  28 
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Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008). 
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Source: Prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008). 
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Mean Mean S.D.
Births in 1995 0.027 Births in 1998 0.027 -
Individual characteristics in 1994: Individual characteristics in 1996:
Age 31.64 Age 31.74 10.35
Wants children 0.312 Wants children 0.218 -
No. of children already in the household 0.839 No. of children already in the household 1.203
Presence of a spouse 0.657 Presence of a spouse 0.633 -
Wages of the subject 69276.6 Wages of the subject 260399.1 550861.5
Household income (equivalence scale) 3879.3 Household income (equivalence scale) 2924.8 3676.5
Owner-occupier 0.902 Owner-occupier 0.886 -
Satisfaction with life 0.128 Satisfaction with life 0.116 -
In work 0.67 In work 0.641 -
Completed secondary or vocational
education 0.259
Completed secondary or vocational
education 0.258 -
Completed higher education 0.451 Completed higher education 0.423 -
Living in a rural area 0.243 Living in a rural area 0.239 -
Percentage of urban dwellers in
sample (nationwide figure: 0.73)
0.76
Percentage of urban dwellers in
sample (nationwide figure: 0.74)
0.80
Age composition (subjects in the age
group concerned as a percentage of
all subjects between 15 and 34 years)
Age composition (subjects in the age
group concerned as a percentage of
all subjects between 15 and 34 years)
15-19 years 23.6 15-19 years 24.3
20-24 years 25.4 20-24 years 26.8
25-29 years 24.6 25-29 years 25.9
30-34 years 26.5 30-34 years 23.0
Mean Mean S.D.
Births in 2001 0.028 Births in 2004 0.0254 -
Individual characteristics in 2000: Individual characteristics in 2003:
Age 31.32 Age 31.29 10.44
Wants children 0.282 Wants children 0.197 -
No. of children already in the household 0.784 No. of children already in the household 0.707 0.896
Presence of a spouse 0.528 Presence of a spouse 0.477 -
Wages of the subject 780.9 Wages of the subject 1961.1 3214.2
Household income (equivalence scale) 2559.7 Household income (equivalence scale) 3821.9 6275
Owner-occupier 0.903 Owner-occupier 0.902 -
Satisfaction with life 0.181 Satisfaction with life 0.327 -
In work 0.605 In work 0.639 -
Completed secondary or vocational
education 0.247
Completed secondary or vocational
education 0.256 -
Completed higher education 0.431 Completed higher education 0.438 -
Living in a rural area 0.282 Living in a rural area 0.261 -
Percentage of urban dwellers in
sample (nationwide figure: 0.73)
0.72
Percentage of urban dwellers in
sample (nationwide figure: 0.73)
0.74
Age composition (subjects in the age
group concerned as a percentage of
all subjects between 15 and 34 years)
Age composition (subjects in the age
group concerned as a percentage of
all subjects between 15 and 34 years)
15-19 years 26.0 15-19 years 23.0
20-24 years 27.4 20-24 years 26.4
25-29 years 25.7 25-29 years 25.9






























































Source: Calculated by the author based on forms returned from the RLMS. Percentages of urban 
dwellers nationwide were calculated by the author based on data from Rosstat (2008).  31 
 Observations Min. Max. Mean Standard  deviation
Births 20622 0 1 0.03 -
Age 20622 14 48 31.51 10.20
Wants children 20622 0 1 0.25 -
No. of children already in the household 19770 0 8 1.19 0.98
Presence of a spouse 20554 0 1 0.56 -
Living with a man of an age eligible to receive pension benefits 19770 0 1 0.07 -
Living with a woman of an age eligible to receive pension benefits 19770 0 1 0.18 -
Owner-occupier 20531 0 1 0.89 -
Living area of the dwelling 19650 3 230 35.72 16.08
Total floor area of the dwelling 19013 0 310 53.58 21.98
Satisfaction with life 20408 0 1 0.21 -
Expectations concerning future standard of living 17369 0 1 0.28 -
In work 20622 0 1 0.64 -
Completed secondary or vocational education 20622 0 1 0.26 -
Completed higher education 20622 0 1 0.43 -
Living in a rural area 19770 0 1 0.27 -
Northwest region 20622 0 1 0.07 -
Central region 20622 0 1 0.18 -
Volga-Vyatka 20622 0 1 0.18 -
Caucasus 20622 0 1 0.14 -
Urals 20622 0 1 0.16 -
Western Siberia 20622 0 1 0.09 -
Eastern Siberia/Far East 20622 0 1 0.09 -
Household income (equivalence scale) 19718 0 472915 3148.79 5960.26
Household expenditure (equivalence scale) 19770 0 3E+07 5485.05 209860.12
Real household income 19718 0 1040413 8175.47 15282.57
Real household expenditure 19770 0 8E+07 14213.72 566163.92
Number of samples which gave answers to all the questions 15111




















Source: Calculated by the author based on forms returned from the RLMS. 
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Odds ratio Z-value P>|z| Odds ratio Z-value P>|z| Odds ratio Z-value P>|z| Odds ratio Z-value P>|z|
Age 0.84 ** -3.95 0.00 0.86 ** -6.71 0.00 0.89 ** -4.27 0.00 0.89 ** -4.21 0.00
Wants children 2.23 + 1.74 0.08 0.77 -0.85 0.40 4.42 ** 4.70 0.00 2.45 ** 2.88 0.00
No. of children already in
the household
0.56 -1.60 0.11 0.32 ** -4.64 0.00 0.52 * -2.55 0.01 0.90 -0.39 0.70
Square of no. of children
already in the household
1.14 * 2.17 0.03 1.22 ** 5.09 0.00 1.14 ** 3.13 0.00 1.03 0.74 0.46
Presence of a spouse 2.91 * 2.29 0.02 4.15 ** 4.32 0.00 3.40 ** 3.52 0.00 1.13 0.65 0.52
Wages of the subject 0.99 -0.64 0.52 0.99 -0.69 0.49 0.99 + -1.82 0.07 1.00 0.13 0.90
Household income
(equivalence scale)




1.00 0.42 0.67 1.00 -1.37 0.17 1.00 -0.37 0.71 1.00 0.73 0.47
Owner-occupier 0.45 -1.61 0.11 1.20 0.40 0.69 1.03 0.06 0.95 1.43 0.74 0.46
Satisfaction with life 1.01 0.02 0.98 0.98 -0.06 0.95 0.96 -0.09 0.93 1.79 + 1.33 0.09
(Reference category: other than the top two levels (“completely satisfied” and “generally satisfied”) in a five-level scheme)
In work 1.32 0.55 0.58 1.58 1.28 0.20 0.97 -0.09 0.93 2.60 * 2.36 0.02
Completed secondary or
vocational education
1.46 0.63 0.53 0.90 -0.26 0.80 0.94 -0.16 0.87 1.02 0.05 0.96
Completed higher education 2.56 + 1.67 0.09 1.10 0.25 0.81 1.09 0.22 0.83 2.11 + 1.65 0.09
(Reference category for education: Less than completed secondary education)
Living in a rural area 0.79 -0.44 0.66 1.12 0.35 0.72 0.99 -0.04 0.97 1.34 0.88 0.38
Chi square 54.41 ** 96.85 ** 107.98 ** 65.06 **
N 1739 2164 2120 2208
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.13
Log-likelihood -120.28 -243.44 -208.35 -213.78
Odds ratio Z-value P>|z| Odds ratio Z-value P>|z| Odds ratio Z-value P>|z| Odds ratio Z-value P>|z|
Age 0.87 ** -7.31 0.00 0.87 ** -7.36 0.00 0.88 ** -7.31 0.00 0.87 ** -7.21 0.00
Wants children 0.38 ** -3.47 0.00 0.54 ** -2.58 0.01 0.53 ** -2.65 0.01 1.05 0.19 0.85
No. of children already in
the household
0.22 ** -6.11 0.00 0.31 ** -5.05 0.00 0.22 ** -6.57 0.00 0.38 ** -3.14 0.00
Square of no. of children
already in the household
1.22 ** 4.32 0.00 1.22 ** 3.66 0.00 1.34 ** 6.35 0.00 1.11 0.92 0.36
Presence of a spouse 3.38 ** 4.25 0.00 3.06 ** 4.25 0.00 1.63 ** 3.50 0.00 2.95 ** 4.09 0.00
Wages of the subject 0.99 -0.13 0.90 0.99 -1.02 0.31 1.00 0.18 0.86 0.99 -1.58 0.11
Household income
(equivalence scale)




1.00 -0.10 0.92 1.00 0.75 0.46 1.00 -0.25 0.80 1.00 -0.59 0.55
Owner-occupier 0.62 -1.53 0.13 0.83 -0.62 0.54 0.64 -1.57 0.12 0.66 -1.50 0.13
Satisfaction with life 1.59 + 1.62 0.10 2.67 ** 4.30 0.00 1.50 + 1.80 0.07 0.90 -0.43 0.67
(Reference category: other than the top two levels (“completely satisfied” and “generally satisfied”) in a five-level scheme)
In work 1.06 0.20 0.84 2.12 ** 2.71 0.01 1.27 0.89 0.37 3.05 ** 3.61 0.00
Completed secondary or
vocational education
2.53 * 2.56 0.01 2.20 ** 2.60 0.01 2.43 ** 2.63 0.01 0.95 -0.15 0.88
Completed higher
education
2.44 * 2.37 0.02 1.46 1.17 0.24 2.81 ** 3.00 0.00 1.33 0.92 0.36
(Reference category for education: Less than completed secondary education)
Living in a rural area 2.05 ** 2.78 0.01 2.40 ** 3.70 0.00 1.16 0.57 0.57 1.25 0.88 0.38
Chi square 136.73 ** 157.9 ** 133.19 ** 123.1 **
N 2530 2776 2902 2959
P s e u d o  R 2 0 . 20 . 1 80 . 1 60 . 1 5
Log-likelihood -279.8 -348.3 -348.27 -344.88
2001（Round 10） 2002（Round 11） 2003（Round 12） 2004（Round 13）
1995（Round 6） 1996（Round 7） 1998（Round 8） 2000（Round 9）
Table 3: Determinants of Childbirth in Russia (Women Between 15 and 49 Years of Age) (1): 

































**: significant at 1% level; *: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level    33 
  β P>|Z| β P>|Z| β P>|Z| β P>|Z|
Age -0.13 ** 0.00 -0.13 ** 0.00 -0.13 ** 0.00 -0.13 ** 0.00
Wants children -0.07 0.51 -0.09 0.42 -0.07 0.51 -0.09 0.41
No. of children already in the household -1.04 ** 0.00 -1.04 ** 0.00 -1.04 ** 0.00 -1.05 ** 0.00
Square of no. of children already in the
household
0.17 ** 0.00 0.17 ** 0.00 0.17 ** 0.00 0.17 ** 0.00
Presence of a spouse 0.92 ** 0.00 0.93 ** 0.00 0.92 ** 0.00 0.93 ** 0.00
Living with a man of an age eligible to
receive pension benefits
0.43 * 0.02 0.43 * 0.02 0.43 * 0.02 0.41 * 0.03
Living with a woman of an age eligible
to receive pension benefits
0.14 0.30 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.27
Owner-occupier -0.46 ** 0.00 -0.44 ** 0.00 -0.46 ** 0.00 -0.45 ** 0.00
Living area of the dwelling -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.16
Total floor area of the dwelling 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.17
Satisfaction with life 0.37 ** 0.00 0.35 ** 0.00 0.37 ** 0.00 0.36 ** 0.00
(Reference category: oher than the top two levels (“completely satisfied” and “generally satisfied”) in a five-level scheme)
Expectations concerning future standard
of living
0.17 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.13
(Reference category: other than the top two levels (“will improve” and “will probably improve”) in a five-level scheme)
In work 0.36 ** 0.00 0.33 ** 0.01 0.36 ** 0.00 0.33 ** 0.01
Completed secondary or vocational
education
0.52 ** 0.00 0.52 ** 0.00 0.52 ** 0.00 0.52 ** 0.00
Completed higher education 0.50 ** 0.00 0.48 ** 0.00 0.49 ** 0.00 0.49 ** 0.00
(Reference category for education: Less than completed secondary education)
Living in a rural area 0.19 0.12 0.25 + 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.25 + 0.05
Northwest region 0.68 * 0.01 0.66 * 0.02 0.69 * 0.01 0.67 * 0.01
Central region 0.28 0.22 0.31 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.30 0.19
Volga-Vyatka 0.55 * 0.02 0.60 ** 0.01 0.56 * 0.02 0.60 * 0.01
Caucasus 0.95 ** 0.00 0.97 ** 0.00 0.96 ** 0.00 0.96 ** 0.00
Urals 0.64 ** 0.01 0.67 ** 0.01 0.64 ** 0.01 0.66 ** 0.01
Western Siberia 0.59 * 0.02 0.59 * 0.02 0.60 * 0.02 0.59 * 0.02
Eastern Siberia/Far East 0.69 ** 0.01 0.72 ** 0.01 0.69 ** 0.01 0.72 ** 0.01
(Reference category: Moscow and St. Petersburg)
Household income (equivalence scale) 0.00 0.72 - - - - - -
Square of household income (equivalence
scale)
0.00 0.48 - - - - - -
Household expenditure (equivalence
scale)
- - 0.00 0.15 - - - -
Square of household expenditure
(equivalence scale)
- - 0.00 0.82 - - - -
Real household income - - - - 0.00 0.92 - -
Square of real household income - - - - 0.00 0.52 - -
Real household expenditure - - - - - - 0.00 0.20
Square of real household expenditure - - - - - - 0.00 0.97
1995 dummy -0.46 + 0.07 -0.49 + 0.05 -0.46 + 0.07 -0.48 + 0.06
1996 dummy 0.17 0.40 0.17 0.39 0.17 0.40 0.18 0.38
1998 dummy 0.05 0.81 0.08 0.71 0.05 0.80 0.08 0.69
2000 dummy -0.17 0.46 -0.12 0.59 -0.16 0.47 -0.12 0.59
2001 dummy 0.06 0.76 0.08 0.68 0.06 0.74 0.08 0.67
2002 dummy 0.11 0.56 0.17 0.36 0.11 0.55 0.17 0.35
2003 dummy -0.01 0.95 0.00 0.99 -0.01 0.96 0.00 0.99
(Reference category: 2004)
Constant -0.85 * 0.01 -0.96 ** 0.01 -0.87 * 0.01 -0.93 * 0.01
No. of Observation 15111 15151 15111 15151
Chi square 563.20 ** 568.10 ** 563.28 ** 567.68 **
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15
Log-likelihood -1655.08 -1667.93 1655.04 -1668.14
Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) Specification (4)
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Source: Same as with Table 1 and Footnote 5. 
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Figure 9: Population Pyramid for Russia in 2004 (1,000 people) 
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